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Introduction
The diffusion of access to broadband services is high on the political agenda of developed countries because of the positive externalities involved with the adoption of such technology. 1 The political debate rotates about what are the policies most conducive to achieve fast and rapid diffusion of broadband access infrastructure. 2 Broadband access can be provided via different technological platforms or types of networks. An important feature therefore is the role of legacy telecommunications systems in place and to which extent market power with the legacy system can be transferred also to the emerging broadband market. Regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector was aimed at introducing competition during the last decade or so. Whereas this was fairly successful for certain technologies, such as mobile telecommunications where market concentration has been reduced substantially, it was much less so for the fixed, or wireline, network. An international comparison in the wireline access markets shows that for most OECD countries the market share of the incumbent wireline firm is well above 90 per cent.
As wireline access is key in providing broadband services, policy makers have to find ways in with this market power problem. There are generally two policy issues at stake: first, the objective of rapid diffusion of broadband access; second, the issue of economic conditions of service provision.
Although the two issues are interrelated, for the sake of simplicity let us assume them as separate for the moment. In the political discourse, diffusion is getting the main attention, as countries are typically benchmarked by this parameter. The argumentation generally is that competition drives diffu-1 There is for instance the Recommendation of the OECD of 12 February 2004. 2 For a summary of the policy options see Umino (2002) .
sion (ITU, 2003) . Competition can be enhanced in two ways: first, through service competition on the same network facility trough open access provisions; second, through facility based competition by means of alternative local access modes. The former will be referred to as intra-platform competition and the latter as inter -platform competition. Substantial regulatory effort during the last decade has been devoted towards creating the conditions for equal access, in particular though the unbundling of infrastructure elements for local access. This turned out as being a particularly challenging task for regulators as they had to trade off the interests of new entrants for low access prices with the interests of the incumbent in terms of long-term incentives for infrastructure investments. The success of unbundling measures as device for reducing incumbent's market power turned out as being mixed so far, with regulators in countries such as the U.S. basically giving up on the objective. 3 As a result the option for inducing facility based competition seems to be the less controversial one from a regulatory point of view, provided that market are capable of accommodating alternative infrastructures (Faulhaber and Hagendorn, 2000) . This paper addresses the determinants of diffusion of broadband infrastructure by looking at the U.S.
Federal States. It tries to identify in particular to what extent intra-and inter -platform competition contribute to accelerating the speed of diffusion.
The diffusion of broadband access in the U.S. has been subject to a number of empirical studies. Aron and Burnstein (2003) have found evidence that facility based competition drives diffusion using cross section data of the U.S.
Federal states. Wallsten (2005) looked into the effectiveness of regulatory and policy variables, including subsidies, to affect diffusion of broadband access. He finds that all measures, apart from access to rights of way, are not significant. 4 A major novelty of this study is the use of a panel data set for the U.S. Federal States over the period 1999 − 2004, which provides the opportunity to achieve robust statistical results. The study is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents some background information to understand the broadband market and its institutional settings. Section 3 illustrates the diffusion model that serves for the econometric study. Section 4 presents and discusses the results and tests their robustness. Section 5 concludes.
The broadband market
The most common networks to provide broadband access are traditional telecommunications access networks using copper pair cable in the local loop and the cable TV networks using different versions of coaxial cables. In the U.S., as in many other countries, these infrastructures have been built long time ago and hence significant upgrade investments are required to achieve broadband transmission capability in the local access network. In the case of telecommunications infrastructure this is achieved by the switch to digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, 5 whereas with cable TV infrastructure it requires investments that allow also for reverse flow of traffic. 6 There are also other technological platforms that can provide access to broadband 4 One major limitation pointed out also by the author is that the policy variables have no time dimension, i.e. they are assumed constant throughout the sample period.
5 DSL requires investment into the so-called central office which allows to increase the transmission capacity and splits the traffic into voice and data. second, by interconnection mandate, meaning that new networks would be able to interconnect; third, incumbent operators were mandated to unbundled network elements, such as local loop access to customers. The driving idea of the latter was that new entrants would attempt to get wholesale access to incumbent's customers to "taste the water" and successively possibly invest in own infrastructure. This is the "stepping stone" theory to facility based competition. However, empirical evidence seems to suggest that should be allowed to provide also voice telephony (Crandall et al. 2002) , a market from which they generally are excluded. Likewise, local telecommu-nications companies are compelled in most countries to "unbundled" local access loops, i.e. to share or entirely provide a subscriber line to other firms at cost based prices, whereas cable TV firms do not have such obligations.
Legacy regulatory measures therefore are expected to have a strong bearing on the diffusion of broadband access, and an intense political discussion is ongoing on how these regulatory measures should be updated to take the technological developments into account (Hausman et al. 2001) . There seems to be a consensus on the claim that competition is a major driving Let y it denote the number of agents that have adopted the new technology in state i at time t; let y * it denote the total number of potential adopters. The fraction of the total number of potential adopters in state i that have adopted before time t follows the logistic distribution function:
The variable a it in equation (1) the function otherwise. For example, when a it is very high, we may say that state i at time t is very "advanced" in its adoption rate. The variable b it is a measure of the diffusion growth. This can be verified from differentiating
(1) with respect to t, and rearranging:
This implies that b it equals the growth rate in the number of adopters at time t, relative to the fraction of adopters that have not yet adopted at time t. Equivalently, this says that the number of new adopters at time t, relative to the fraction of adopters that have not yet adopted at time t, is a linear function of the total number of consumers that have already adopted at time t. This reflects the epidemic character of the logistic diffusion model. It can be verified that the second derivative of (1) is positive for y it /y * it < 1/2, and negative if the reverse holds. The diffusion of the number adopters thus follows an S-shaped pattern, with a maximum diffusion speed reached when half of the total number of potential adopters has effectively adopted the new technology. In our econometric analysis we transform equation (1) as follows:
The dependent variable, z it , is the logarithm of total number of adopters relative to the number of potential adopters that have not yet adopted.
We now specify the three essential determinants for the diffusion of mobile telecommunication services: the total number of potential adopters, y * it ; the location variable, a it ; and the growth variable b it . As typically done in diffusion studies of this kind (Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary, 1998; Gruber and Verboven, 2001a ) the parameter y * it may be given, considering also that estimation would be problematic, since most states are still at the early stages of diffusion. Gruber and Verboven (2001a) resolved this problem by pooling the data, and estimating a parameter, common for all countries.
This facilitates estimation because one can exploit information from both countries in early and in more mature stages of diffusion. This approach was also justified in their study as they considered a relatively homogeneous group of E.U. countries. Second, this assumption makes the model linear and thus very much improves the scope for the estimation of the remaining parameters. The location variable a it and the growth variable b it in (2) are specified in a general form as:
The parameters α 0 i and β 0 i are state-specific location and growth effects. The vector x it includes continuous variables affecting the location or growth variables. The dependent variable, the number of broadband subscribers may be normalised in different ways; by relating them to the total population in the state, the number of households, or by the number of fixed telecommunications lines in the state. In line with common practice, our preferred measure of broadband penetration is the ratio of the number of broadband subscribers and population in the state. 12 In any case, the choice of any of all these measures has no significant impact on the qualitative statistical results. The independent variables are as follows:
Concentration index of inter -platform competition : 
Concentration index of intra-platform competition :
HH intra j = 1/n j , with n j being the number of firms (providers) for platform j. It is the standard Herfindahl index in the symmetric case.
This has the range of 0 < HH intra j ≤ 1. The higher the value the higher the market power of firms in that platform market (the more concentrated that market).
Degree of Competition in Telecommunications :
it is indicated by the number of lines served by the competitive local exchange carries over the total number of fixed lines within the state. The higher this value, the higher the competition degree of the telecommunications network.
Telecommunication Density :
for DSL technology to be viable the length of the local loop, which is the distance between the subscriber and the so-called central office should not be too large, normally within the range of a few kilometers.
Thus the more central offices a state has, the more it is amenable to supplying broadband access. This density may be indicated by the ratio between the number of lines and the number of central offices.
The higher this number, the lower the density of broadband access in-frastructure. It is expected that density should have a positive impact on diffusion.
Potential for Broadband Competition on TLC Lines :
it is the share of central offices (CO) upgraded for equal access (EA) on total CO indicates the potential for broadband competition on telecommunications lines. Table ( A specific source of sample selection in panel surveys is attrition, that is, the fact that some of the units originally included in the panel may be lost through time. However, given the type and the sources of our dataset, here attrition may reasonably be considered as a typical case of random missing. That is, it is unrelated to the response variable.
Therefore it does not bias the information carried by the sample.
Results and discussion
The econometric analysis has been conducted specifying three different models. The first specification, which we refer to as the basic one, includes only our intra-and inter-concentration indexes, both as location and as diffusion factors, and a variable capturing the growth in the general economic conditions of the states. The other two models allow for a richer framework where the other measures of the evolution of the competition degree in the telecommunications sector are accounted for.
For each specification, the Random Effects (RE) and the Fixed Effects (FE) estimators have been used and tested. Table ( 2) contains the results.
They indicate that inter -platform competition (HH inter ) has a strong impact on diffusion, whatever the specification adopted. The signs of the parameter estimates however need some qualifications. Stronger platform competition has an important negative influence on the location parameter, but the impact on the diffusion speed is positive. This suggests that, in states with inter -platform competition, the initial availability of broadband is low, but in the longer term this competition effect improves and overtakes the availability effect. In other words, to reach outer areas, infrastructure competition is conducive in driving penetration. A totally different picture seems to emerge from the parameter estimates for intra-platform competition. Concerning competition on cable TV platforms (HH intra-cable), the results suggest that initially competition has a positive impact, but this fades away over time. This result may be due to the fact that there are typically non-overlapping cable franchises and cable operators are not required to unbundled network elements. For the wireline telecommunications (DSL) platforms (HH intra-dsl ), the signs for the parameter estimates are similar. The signs and significance of the estimated parameters remain fairly constant across the different specifications estimated. However, the Hausman test for the hypothesis of no difference between the two estimators always rejects the null. Since the FE estimator is consistent when the unobserved effects and the covariates are correlated whereas RE is inconsistent, a statistically significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the appropriateness of the RE estimator.
Robustness of results
In this section some tests are carried out to check the robustness of the results to potential problems which might bias our estimates. Given the outcome of the Hausman test and the significance of all coefficients, our preferred specification is the FE estimator of Model 2.
Strict exogeneity of the covariates and the full-rank condition ensure the consistency and the asymptotic normality of the FE estimator. Assuming for the moment that these two conditions are satisfied (we address the endogeneity issue later), correct inference requires that the idiosyncratic errors have a constant variance across time and individuals and are serially uncorrelated. As to serial correlation we regress the fixed effects residuals on their lagged value. We cannot accept the null of non-significance of the coefficient then the error term of our model displays strong serial dependence. In such a case, the usual FE standard errors can be very misleading. Suspect on the accuracy of our inference arises also because of the presence of heteroskedasticity. So concludes in fact the test we carried out which is based on the assumption that under homoskedasticity the squared fixed effects residuals is uncorrelated with any function of the regressors.
Our proposed solution for the serial dependence and the non-uniform variance in the idiosyncratic errors is twofold. First, we run a fully robust variance matrix estimator. Such an estimator is valid in the presence of any heteroskedasticity or serial dependence in the errors provided that T , the number of periods is small relative to n, the number of individuals (the U.S.
Federal States in our case). Second, rather than compute a robust variance matrix for the FE estimator we allow for a more general conditional variance matrix. Yet given the dimension of our dataset, using an unrestricted conditional variance matrix might lead to poor finite-sample performance of the FEGLS estimator. Then we employ a restricted form of the matrix. Precisely we assume that the error term has different cross-section variances and it follows a stable first-order autoregressive process. First two columns of table (3) report the results of these two robust estimates. Both models show only slight differences in the signs and sizes of the estimated coefficients relative to the unrobust FE estimator. This means that crosssectional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation have not seriously biased previous figures. Moreover the estimated coefficients with the FEGLS (second column of table 3) are always very significant. This is expected since the GLS estimator produces much lower standard errors than those of the robust-variance estimator since it uses more information.
There is concern about the potential simultaneity of the computed inter -and intra-platform competition indexes. Simultaneity would arise were these explanatory variables determined simultaneously along with the independent. In such a case, there would exist correlation between the error term and the simultaneous covariates and our FE estimates would be inconsistent. A general approach to estimate a panel data model when the strict exogeneity assumption fails is to use a transformation to remove the unobserved individual effects and then search for instruments for the endogenous regressors. A drawback with the FE transformation is that one should have strictly exogenous instruments. Using a FD transformation instead allows to remove the unobserved individual effects and lagged levels (two periods back) of the endogenous covariates can be exploited as instruments. We apply this technique to our model and the results are reported in the third column of table (3). We note that the absolute magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are always higher relative to the previous estimators. This is the prove that the simultaneity bias does produce some distortion in our previous results. Remarkably our considerations about the role of the intra-and inter -platform competition on the location and the speed of the broadband adoption process are strengthened in the light of the last results.
Finally, we want to test a dynamic specification of our model. This implies to include a lag of the dependent variable among the regressors.
Were the associated coefficient significant the adoption process would exhibit state dependence. That is, the current state of the broadband diffusion would depend on last period's state. This is reasonable when one considers the positive indirect externalities which may arise as the adoption process evolves. The more people decide to use a broadband line, the more goods and services compatible with that technology are developed. Therefore these network effects do impact significantly the adoption process enhancing the expected benefit of new consumers from broadband lines due to the wider availability of complementary services.
The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of our model causes endogeneity and prevents us from using the estimation methods available for static models. Rather than applying an exactly identified estimator we want to follow the procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). They suggest using the entire set of lagged values of the dependent and of the other endogenous covariates (the Herfindahl indexes in our case) as instruments in a GMM procedure. This allows to exploit the maximum information available in each period in order to improve the efficiency of the estimator. As shown in table (4) the coefficient associated to the installed base (a proxy of the network effects) is positive and highly significant. Moreover it is important to note that the inclusion of this new variable does not alter the main message of our story. Finally the lines at the bottom of the table report two different tests. The former, the Sargan test, does not reject the over-identification hypothesis confirming the validity of our instruments. The latter, the AR(1) and the AR(2) Arellano-Bond tests, states the presence of a first-order serial correlation (expected since now we are working with first-differenced errors) but the absence of any serial dependence of higher order.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated into the determinants of diffusion of broadband access, which is considered of prime importance for sustained long-term productivity growth. Particular emphasis was placed on disentangling the effect of intra-platform and inter -platform competition. The econometric results provide robust support for the hypothesis that inter -platform is more conducive for driving diffusion than intra-platform competition. This may interpreted as follows: to drive diffusion to the maximum you should ideally need strong inter -platform competition and not to be worried about competition on the platform. This result also has regulatory implications which may be seen in the present context of the current regulatory debate in the US. The FCC is about to reorient its policy priorities reducing the regulatory effort toward equal access conditions to networks incumbent wireline firms and in favour of investment incentives that promote inter -platform competition. The results of this paper are consistent with such a policy switch. The future agenda of work is to investigate whether these results are confirmed also on a cross-country basis. 
